Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Proximal theory, philosophy: theories of learning or language acquisition are called proximal, which assume that the meanings to be learned are to be located at the nerve endings of the learning subject. It is assumed that the meanings are not "in the head," as the formulation of H. Putnam states (H. Putnam, "The Meaning of Meaning”. In Philosophical Papers, Vol 2. Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge, 227). The counterpositions to the proximal theory are summarized under the concept of distal theories. These assume that meanings are to be settled on the surfaces of the objects. Distal theories proceed from a social learning, proximal theories from a subject-centric language acquisition. See also distal theories, language acquisition, meaning, meaning theory, twin earth._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Donald Davidson on Proximal Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
I (c) 53 Proximal/Meaning Theory/Davidson: same meaning with the same stimulus patterns. >Stimuli, >Stimulus meaning. Distal: same objects - here it must be translated several times: 1. Comparison of the linguistic response to changes in the environment 2. Own sentence that the radical interpreter himself/herself would express. I (c) 53f Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: same objects and causes for speakers. DavidsonVsQuine: the proximal theory leads to classical skepticism. >Skepticism. E.g. Gavagai: both could mean the same, whereby the same circumstances make all sentences true for one and for the other one all false. >Gavagai. Proximal/Quine: evidence is primary. Distal/Davidson: truth is primary: the meaning is linked to the truth conditions. Quine/DummettVsEvans: we should not align meaning on truth conditions. DavidsonVs: too simplified, every theory must relate meaning to truth and to evidence. Evidence/Davidson: are relations between sentences. - (There are no last data, only observing sentences). VsDistal theory: problem: there are probably several candidates for the position of the common cause item. E.g. every more comprehensive segment of the universe to the birth of the speaker for the utterance of "this is red". And so it would be the cause for any other disposition of the speaker. - That would equal the meaning of all observation sentences. I (c) 58 Proximal theory: does not guarantee that our theory of the world applies at all. Difference proximal/distal: as between meaning theories which a) assigns to the evidence (proximal, stimulus pattern) or b) to the truth (distal, objects) the primary status. Quine per a) (proximal). >Truth conditions, >Circumstances. I (c) 58 QuineVsEvans/DummettVsEvans: meaning does not come from truth conditions. Instead: proximal theory: stimulus patterns (evidence) instead of objects. - This is simplistic, since every meaning theory has to relate meaning to truth and to evidence. >Evidence, >Meaning theory. I (c) 59 DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: VsProximal theory: leads to skepticism, relativization on the individual: cartesian. >Cartesianism. I (c) 59 Evidence/Davidson: must be relations between propositions. - The theory cannot support this from the outside. I (c) 61 Proximal meaning theory: similar to Descartes, Dummett, Frege: stimulus patterns instead of objects are decisive. - - - Glüer II 53 DavidsonVs social character of meaning: idiolect is also in principle interpretable (via causal hypotheses). >Idiolect._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Proximal Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27